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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NICK FAULKNER and KARYL 
FAULKNER, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
TOM C. THORPE, PAUL W. STONE, 
and THOMAS K. WELCH, 
Defendants and Respondent. 
THOMAS K. WELCH, 
Cross-Plaintiff and Respondent. 
v. 
PAUL W. STONE, 
Cross-Defendant. 
Case No. 900389-CA 
Category 14(b) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, THOMAS K. WELCH 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2) (j) , Utah 
Code Annotated, and the Utah Supreme Court's notice of referral 
dated June 28, 1990. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Can the sellers under a real estate contract forfeit the 
buyer's interest as liquidated damages for default, and then later 
recover installment payments under the contract from an 
intermediate assignee/assignor of the buyer's interest? 
II. Can the sellers under a real estate contract enter into 
a new and different contract for the sale of the property with the 
last assignee/buyer under the original contractf and then later 
recover installment payments due under the new contract from the 
intermediate assignee/assignor under the original contract? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case 
Plaintiffs Nick and Karyl Faulkner brought the action below 
to recover several delinquent monthly installment payments under 
an Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract for the sale of apartments. 
The Faulkners named Tom C. Thorpe ("Thorpe"), Thomas K. Welch 
("Welch"), and Paul W. Stone ("Stone") as defendants in the action. 
Thorpe was the buyer under the original Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. Welch was Thorpe's assignee under the original Uniform 
Real Estate Contract. Stone was Welch's assignee under the 
original Uniform Real Estate Contract and the buyer of the 
apartments under the Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract 
subsequently executed by the Faulkners and Stone. The Faulkners 
contend that as an assignee of the original Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, Welch is liable for Stone's apparent failure to pay 
monthly installments due under the Amended Uniform Real Estate 
Contract subsequently entered between the Faulkners and Stone. 
Welch contends that he is not liable for any delinquent 
installments that may be due under either the original Uniform Real 
Estate Contract or the Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract because 
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the Faulkners forfeited the buyer's interest under the original 
Uniform Real Estate Contract and subsequently entered into a new 
contract (the Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract) with Stone and 
to which Welch is not a party. 
Course of Proceedings 
and Disposition Below 
Welch moved for summary judgment dismissing the Faulkners1 
complaint with respect to him. The trial court granted Welch's 
motion for summary judgment. The Faulkners' appealed from that 
judgment. The other defendants below are not parties to this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following is a statement of the undisputed facts presented 
to the trial court. For the Court's convenience copies of the 
affidavits and documents considered by the court below and copies 
of the trial court's ruling and summary judgment are included in 
the Addendum to this Brief. 
In April 1978 the Faulkners sold their eight-plex apartment 
complex (the "apartments") to Tom C. Thorpe under a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract (the "Uniform Real Estate Contract") dated April 
8, 1978. (R. 2, 5-6, Complaint, «[ 5; R. 210, "Exhibit A".) In 
August 1978 Thorpe assigned the buyer's interest in the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract to Thomas K. Welch by written assignment dated 
August 24, 1978. (R. 3, 10, Complaint, 5 6.) In November 1978 
defendant Welch assigned the buyer's interest in the Uniform Real 
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Estate Contract to Paul Stone. (R. 3, 12, Complaint, 5 7; R. 210, 
"Exhibit Bff.) Thereafter, Stone began making the payments due 
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract to the Faulkners through 
Weber Valley Bank, the escrow agent under the contract. (R. 2 05, 
Stone Affidavit, 5 4.) 
Stone1 s November 1981 payment under the* Uniform Real Estate 
Contract was late. As a consequence, Stone was sent a letter dated 
November 30, 1981 signed by the escrow agent (Weber Valley Bank) 
acting on behalf of the Faulkners and countersigned by Nick 
Faulkner, demanding that the default be cured and advising that in 
the event the default was not cured, the plaintiffs had elected 
remedy "A" under paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
(R. 210, "Exhibit C".) Under remedy "A" elected by the Faulkners, 
in the event the default was not cured, the buyer's interest under 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract would be forfeited as liquidated 
damages to the Faulkners as sellers. Stone responded to the demand 
by curing the November 1981 default. (R. 2 05-6, Stone Affidavit, 
11 6.) 
Stone's January 1982 payment was also late. The Faulkners 
responded just as they had in November 1981. Stone received 
another letter from the escrow agent acting on behalf of the 
Faulkners, countersigned by Nick Faulkner, and demanding that the 
latest default be cured and again advising that in the event the 
default was not cured, the Faulkners had elected to forfeit the 
buyer's interest under the Uniform Real Estate Contract pursuant 
to remedy "A" under paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate 
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Contract. Stone was unable to cure this default. (R. 2 06, Stone 
Affidavit, 5 7; R. 210, "Exhibit D,f.) 
In early February 1982, defendant Stone received a second 
letter from the escrow agent sent at the direction of the 
Faulkners. This letter informed Stone that the escrow under the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract had been terminated and that the 
documents in escrow had been released to the plaintiff. (R. 2 06f 
Stone Affidavit, 5 8; R. 210, "Exhibit E".) The documents placed 
in escrow pursuant to the Uniform Real Estate Contract were 
actually delivered to the Faulkners. (R. 241-2.) 
At about that same time in February 1982, the Faulkners sent 
letters to the tenants of the apartments advising them to 
thereafter make their rental payments directly to the Faulkners as 
owners. (R. 207, Stone Affidavit, 5 9.) All of the February 1982 
rental payments were either collected by the Faulkners directly or 
paid over to them. Stone also turned his rent ledger over to the 
Faulkners. (R. 207, Stone Affidavit, 55 10 and 11; R. 210, 
"Exhibit Fff.) Between February 1, 1982 and the end of May 1982, 
the Faulkners collected all of the rents from the apartments in a 
total sum in excess of $12,000. (R. 207, Stone Affidavit, 5 12 and 
R. 210, "Exhibit Gft.) 
Sometime after the Faulkners took possession of the property, 
Stone began negotiating with them to regain his interest in the 
forfeited apartments. During the negotiations, the Faulkners 
repeatedly stated that they owned the apartments and were entitled 
to the rents. (R. 207, Stone Affidavit, 5 12.) 
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The negotiations resulted in a new agreement between Faulkners 
and Stone pursuant to which Stone would buy the apartments on the 
same terms provided in the original Uniform Real Estate Contract 
except as modified by a separate written agreement dated May 28, 
1982 and signed by the Faulkners as sellers and Stone as buyer. 
The modifications included the imposition of a $7,000 "penalty" to 
be added to the original purchase price, plus the addition of 
another $3,000 to the purchase price in lieu of immediate payment 
of $1,500 in "out of pocket costs" claimed by the Faulkners. The 
agreement was also modified to provide that in the event of Stone's 
default for failure to make the payments due, the Faulkners1 sole 
remedy would be forfeiture of the buyer's interest in the 
apartments. (R. 208, Stone Affidavit, 5 14; R. 210, "Exhibit H".) 
A new escrow agreement was also entered into between the 
Faulkners and Stone with Weber Valley Bank acting as the escrow 
agent. (R. 208, Stone Affidavit, 5 15; R. 210, "Exhibit I".) The 
Faulkners then notified the tenants of the apartments that Stone 
was "now the owner" of the apartments by a letter dated May 27, 
1982 signed by plaintiff Nick Faulkner. (R. 209, Stone Affidavit, 
5 16; R. 210, "Exhibit J".) 
Welch did not participate in any of the negotiations between 
the Faulkners and Stone following the Faulkners1 forfeiture of the 
buyer's interest under the Uniform Real Estate Contract in January 
1982. Welch was not a party to the Amended Uniform Real Estate 
Contract between the Faulkners and Stone and never gave his consent 
to any modification of the terms of the original Uniform Real 
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Estate Contract. (R. 207-8, Stone Affidavit, 5 13; R. 200, Welch 
Affidavit, 5 4.) 
Several years later Stone apparently failed to make some of 
the payments which were due under the Amended Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. (R. 3, Complaint, 5 8.) The Faulkners then brought the 
action that is the subject of this appeal to recover the delinquent 
installments under the Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract from 
Thorpe, Welch and Stone, though only Stone was a party to that 
agreement. 
The trial court granted Welch's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on two independent grounds, either of which alone is sufficient to 
support summary judgment in his favor. The first rests on the 
Faulkners1 forfeiture of the buyer's interest in the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract in January 1982 in response to a default by Welch's 
assignee, Stone. The second rests on the Faulkners' subsequent 
negotiation of and entry into a new agreement (the Amended Uniform 
Real Estate Contract) with respect to the sale of the subject 
property containing terms materially different than the original 
Uniform Real Estate Contract. (R. 238-240, 248-249.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Faulkners Terminated the Original Uniform Real 
Estate contract by Forfeiting the Buyers Interest 
The undisputed facts show that the Faulkners forfeited the 
buyer's interest under the original Uniform Real Estate Contract 
and terminated the contract. Upon Stone's default under the 
original Uniform Real Estate Contract the Faulkners gave the 
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required notice of their election to forfeit the buyer's interest 
under the contract. When the default was not cured, the Faulkners 
completed the forfeiture by sending a second notice stating that 
the escrow under the contract had been terminated as a result of 
the failure to cure the default. The escrow had in fact been 
terminated and the escrowed documents were delivered to the 
Faulkners. All else asidef the forfeiture and termination of the 
contract was completed when the Faulkners took possession of the 
subject apartments and began collecting rents, representing to 
others that they were the owners. 
The Faulkners* Entry Into the Amended Contract 
With Stone Terminated the Original Contract 
After forfeiting the buyer1s interest under the original 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, the Faulkners entered into an Amended 
Uniform Real Estate Contract with Stone. The Amended Uniform Real 
Estate Contract provided for an increase in the contract purchase 
price and had other different and substantially more burdensome 
terms than the original Uniform Real Estate Contract. The Amended 
Uniform Real Estate Contract was entered without Welch's knowledge 
or consent and was signed by only the Faulkners and Stone. The 
Faulkners1 negotiation of a new agreement with Stone, on terms 
different and more burdensome than the original Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, discharged the original Uniform Real Estate Contract and 
released Welch from any further liability. Of course, not being 
a party to the Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract, Welch is not 
bound by it. 
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This Action Does Not Involve 
Title To the Subject Property 
The Faulkners* complaint seeks only the recovery of delinquent 
installments under the Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract. It 
does not allege a claim to quiet title to the subject apartments. 
Welch does not claim any interest in the apartments, and the trial 
court's summary judgment affirms that he has no interest in the 
apartments. 
There Are No Issues To Be 
Tried Bv a Jury or Otherwise 
The material facts in this case are undisputed. They show 
that Welch is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. There is 
no reason to waste the parties' or the Court's time and money on 
a jury trial. By avoiding an unnecessary trial, the summary 
judgment procedure has accomplished what it is designed to do. 
Sanctions Should Be Imposed 
Because This Appeal is Frivolous 
There is no legal or factual basis for the Faulkners' appeal. 
Accordingly, Welch is entitled to recover its attorneys' fees and 
costs on the minimum sanction for the Faulkners having filed a 
frivolous appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
This appeal is an attempt by the Faulkners to evade the 
consequences of their choices freely made. The Faulkners chose to 
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forfeit the buyer's interest under the original Uniform Real Estate 
Contract and to later negotiate a new and different Amended Uniform 
Real Estate Contract with Stone, and Stone alone, for the sale and 
purchase of the subject apartments. The Faulkners now try to hold 
Welch responsible for Stone's default under the Amended Uniform 
Real Estate Contract. The Faulkners must bear the responsibility 
for their own decisions. They cannot, now that they are apparently 
unhappy with the result, go back and undo what they have done. Nor 
can they shift the consequences of their actions to Welch. 
I 
The Material Facts Are Undisputed 
The Statement of Facts recited above is a statement of the 
undisputed facts presented to the trial court. The facts are based 
on the allegations of the Faulkners' complaint, the Faulkners* 
answers to interrogatories, the affidavits of Stone and Welch and 
the relevant documents. None of these facts were disputed in the 
Faulkners' memorandum to the trial court in opposition to Welch's 
motion for summary judgment, and accordingly, all are deemed 
admitted under Rule 4-501(6), Chapter 4, Judicial Council Rules of 
Judicial Administration. Likewise, the Faulkners have not disputed 
any of these facts in their brief on this appeal. 
There are no other facts in the record, though the Faulkners* 
brief in various places makes reference to other alleged facts 
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without any record references. Any other alleged facts, not being 
before the trial court below, cannot be considered by this Court 
on appeal. Crook v. Anderson, 115 Ariz. 402, 565 P.2d 908 (1977); 
see. Rosander v. Larsen. 14 Utah 2d 1, 376 P.2d 146 (1962). In 
any event, nothing in the Faulkners' brief purports to dispute or 
add any fact material to the summary judgment granted by the trial 
court. It is undisputed that the Faulkners forfeited the buyer's 
interest under the original Uniform Real Estate Contract and later 
negotiated an Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract with Stone. 
The Faulkners did submit to the trial court Nick Faulkner's 
affidavit in opposition to Welch's motion for summary judgment, but 
the affidavit was stricken by the trial court for failure to state 
facts, as opposed to conclusions, as required by Rule 56(e), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure.2 The Faulkners have neither raised nor 
argued the propriety of the trial court's order striking Nick 
Faulkner's affidavit. Consequently, the Faulkners have waived the 
right to appeal the trial court's order in that respect. Berube 
v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.. Ill P.2d 1033, 1039 at n. 7 (Utah 1989); 
Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1983). 
At various places in the Faulkner's brief they make vague 
reference to payments received by Welch from Stone at some time in 
the past. The references are made without citation to the record 
and, in any event, are not material to the issues raised on this 
appeal. 
2
 A copy of Nick Faulkner's affidavit and Welch's memorandum 
supporting the reasons for striking the affidavit are included in 
the addendum to the Faulkner's brief. 
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II 
The Faulkners1 Forfeiture of the Buyerfs Interest 
Precludes Them From Recovering From Welch as an 
Assignee/Assignor of the Buyer's Interest 
The undisputed facts show that as their remedy for Stone's 
breach of the original Uniform Real Estate Contract, the Faulkners 
chose to and did forfeit the buyer's interest in the apartments 
under the contract. It is undisputed that when Stone defaulted 
under the original Uniform Real Estate Contract, (1) the Faulkners 
sent a notice of default in which they selected forfeiture and 
liquidated damages as their remedy; (2) when the default was not 
cured, the Faulkners terminated the escrow, received the documents 
in escrow, and sent notice that the escrow had been terminated; 
and (3) then the Faulkners took possession of the apartments, 
calling themselves the owners, and began collecting rents. By 
following through on their expressed intention to terminate the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract and forfeit the buyer's interest in 
the apartments, the Faulkners voluntarily gave up any claim for 
damages they might otherwise have had against Welch as an 
assignee/assignor under the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
A. The Uniform Real Estate contract required the Faulkners 
to choose one of the following three alternative remedies 
in the event of default: forfeiture, an action for 
delinquent installments, or an action for foreclosure. 
The buyer's interest under the original Uniform Real Estate 
Contract was assigned from Thorpe to Welch, and then from Welch to 
Stone. Sometime after the assignment to Stone, Stone defaulted by 
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failing to make the payment due in January 1982 .3 The failure to 
make the January 1982 payment was a default under paragraph 16 of 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
Stone's default under paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract presented the Faulkners with the option of choosing one 
of three "alternative" remedies provided in subparagraphs A, B or 
C of that paragraph. The Faulkners could choose (1) to forfeit the 
buyer's interest under subparagraph A, or (2) to bring suit for 
delinquent installments under subparagraph B, or (3) to declare the 
entire unpaid balance due and sue for foreclosure of the contract 
as if it were a note and mortgage under subparagraph C. Under the 
last option, the Faulkners could seek appointment of a receiver to 
take possession and collect rent, but only "upon filing of a 
complaint".4 No other remedies are provided for in the Uniform Real 
Stone had previously defaulted in November 1981, but this 
default was cured. 
4
 Paragraph 16 provides in full as follows: 
16. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof 
by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make any 
payments when the same shall become due, or within fifteen 
days thereafter, the Seller, at his option shall have the 
following alternative remedies: 
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer 
to remedy the default within five days after written 
notice, to be released from all obligations in law and 
in equity to convey said property, and all payments which 
have been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, 
shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages 
for the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer 
agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and 
take possession of said premises without legal processes 
as in its first and former estate, together with all 
improvements and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and 
the said additions and improvements shall remain with the 
land become the property of the Seller, the Buyer 
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Estate Contract. The remedies are expressly stated to be 
"alternative remedies" as opposed to cumulative remedies as is 
sometimes provided. 
B. The Faulkners chose to forfeit the buyer's interest as 
the remedy for the buyer's default xinder the Uniform Real 
Estate contract. 
As the remedy for Stone's January 1982 defaultf the Faulkners 
chose alternative "A", forfeiture of buyer's interest as liquidated 
damages. Their choice is unequivocally shown by both their words 
and deeds. 
becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all 
delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys 
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions 
shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from 
resorting to one of the other remedies hereunder in the 
event of a subsequent default); or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon 
written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect 
to treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed 
immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the 
laws of the State of Utah, and have the property sold and 
the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may 
have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain, the 
case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the 
filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said 
mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and 
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of 
the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant to 
order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of 
judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to posse said 
premises during the period of redemption. 
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Soon after Stone's default, the Faulkners gave the written 
notice of default provided for under alternative "A" and stated 
expressly in that notice that they had chosen to proceed by 
forfeiture under option "A". As one would expect given the 
Faulkners* choice of forfeiture as their remedy, when Stone's 
default was not cured within the time provided, the Faulkners had 
the escrow agent send a second notice stating that the escrow under 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract had been terminated; the documents 
escrowed under the Uniform Real Estate Contract were delivered to 
the Faulkners; and the Faulkners took possession of the property 
without legal process and began collecting the rents. (R. 205-7, 
Stone Affidavit, 55 6 through 10.) 
C. only forfeiture of the buyer1 s interest under the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract would have entitled the Faulkners 
to take possession of the apartments as they did. 
While the Faulkners' conduct is consistent with having 
forfeited the buyer's interest under paragraph 16A of the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract, it is entirely inconsistent with either of 
the other remedies available under paragraphs 16B or 16C. No suit 
for delinquent installments under subparagraph B was initiated for 
Stone's default. Likewise, no foreclosure suit was filed as would 
have been required to foreclose the contract under subparagraph C 
§ 78-37-1, Utah Code Annotated. The only remedy permitting the 
Faulkners to take possession of the property and collect the rents 
without legal process, as they did, was forfeiture under paragraph 
16A. 
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D« After talcing possession, the Faulkners referred to 
themselves as "owners" of the apartments. 
The Faulkners1 forfeiture of the buyer's interest under the 
original Uniform Real Estate Contract for Stone's January 1982 
default is confirmed by the Faulkners' own stcLtements. After Stone 
failed to cure the January 1982 default within the time allowed, 
the Faulkners wrote the tenants of the real property advising them 
that the Faulkners were the owners of the property and that the 
rents should be paid to them. (R. 207, Stone Affidavit, 5 9.) 
The Faulkners also told Stone that they considered themselves the 
owners of the property and entitled to the rents. (R. 2 07, Stone 
Affidavit, 5 12.) When a new agreement was reached with Stone 
regarding his repurchase of the property, the Faulkners executed 
a writing informing the tenants that Stone was "now the owner" of 
the property. (R. 209, Stone Affidavit, 5 16; R. 210, "Exhibit 
J".) 
E. The Faulkners1 forfeiture of the buyer1s interest under 
the original Uniform Real Estate Contract released Welch 
from any further liability under the Contract* 
By having chosen to forfeit the buyer's interest for Stone's 
default, the Faulkners terminated the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
and discharged Welch from any future liability under the original 
Uniform Real Estate Contract or for any damages for its breach. 
This follows both from the language of the contract and the 
applicable law. 
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The contract provides that upon choosing the remedy of 
forfeiture, "all payments which have been made . . . on [the] 
contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as 
liquidated damages for the non-performance of the contract . . ." 
and the property shall become the property of the seller. The 
contract, thus, clearly provides that forfeiture results in 
termination of the contract and limits the plaintiffs' damages for 
the default to the sum of the payments already made. The cases 
adopt a similar rule where the seller has chosen forfeiture as his 
remedy. 
The rule was aptly stated in two Iowa Supreme Court cases. 
In Abodeelv v. Cavras, 221 N.W.2d 494 (Iowa 1974), after having 
elected to declare the contract at an end by sending a notice of 
forfeiture to the buyer, the seller attempted to sue the buyer for 
specific performance and damages for breach of an installment real 
estate contract. The court upheld the trial court's dismissal of 
the seller's action, saying at page 498 that: 
When the [buyer] defaults in the performance of a 
contract for the purchase of real estate the [seller] may 
elect which of the foregoing remedies he wishes to 
pursue. When he exercises the option given him under the 
contract to declare a forfeiture and thus terminate the 
contract, the [seller] cannot, in respect to this same 
default, thereafter change his position and at the same 
time or at another time proceed on a theory based on 
affirmance by suing for damages for breach of the 
contract or for specific performance since one is 
precluded from pursuing inconsistent remedies. The 
remedy of the vendor by way of forfeiture of the contract 
and the continued liability of the purchaser for the 
purchase money are totally inconsistent and may not both 
be pursued. 
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In Gray v. Bowers. 332 N.W.2d 323, 325 (Iowa 1983), the basis for 
the rule was further clarified: 
[W]hen a [seller] exercises a right of forfeiture against 
a defaulting [buyer], the liability of the latter for the 
unpaid purchase money is extinguished. While it is true 
that this result is triggered by the election of a 
remedy, i.e., the forfeiture of the contract, the end 
result is not dependent on the doctrine of election of 
remedies. Such result instead flows from the fact that 
the contract between the parties has been terminated, 
thereby extinguishing any right to recover the unpaid 
purchase price. 
Since an assignee's/assignor's liability arises from and 
depends upon the existence of the contract: originally assigned, a 
forfeiture terminates the liability of the assignee/assignor, and 
in this case terminates Welch's liability. 
Ill 
The Faulkners1 Entry Into a New Agreement for the 
Sale of the Apartments Containing More Burdensome 
Terms Discharges Welch From Any Liability to Faulkners 
After the Faulkners took possession of the real property, 
Stone began negotiations with them in an effort to regain his 
interest in the property. (R. 207, Stone Affidavit, 5 12.) These 
negotiations resulted in an Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract 
and new escrow agreement being entered into by the Faulkners and 
Stone, without the consent or knowledge of Welch. (R. 207-8, Stone 
Affidavit, 5 13; R. 200, Welch Affidavit, I 4; R. 210, "Exhibits 
H and Iff.) As a result of the Faulkners' and Stone's entry into 
the Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract, Welch was released from 
the original Uniform Real Estate Contract, regardless of whether 
the earlier contract had been forfeited. (The execution of the 
18 
Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract "reinstating" the original 
contract with modified terms and the execution of a new escrow 
agreement are also consistent with the termination of the original 
contract by the earlier forfeiture. (R. 210f "Exhibits H and 
I".)). 
Upon the assignment of the buyer's interest in the original 
Uniform Real Estate Contract to Stone, Stone as assignee became 
primarily liable for the purchase price, and Welch as assignor 
became in effect his surety. Gorman v. Butzel, 272 Mich. 525, 262 
N.W. 302 (1935); accord. Boswell v. Lvon. 401 N.E.2d 735, 744 (Ind. 
App. 1980) (recognizing the rule, but finding no change in the 
assignee's obligation under the circumstances there present). Just 
as a surety is released when a material change is made in the 
obligations guaranteed without his consent, an assignor of a real 
estate contract is released from all liability if the seller and 
the last assignee agree to any material change in the terms of the 
original contract of sale. Id. In addition, the seller's entry 
into a new contract with Stone was a novation releasing the 
assignor of the original contract from all liability. 
In Gorman, supra at 3 04-5, the court stated the rule as 
follows: 
When a [seller] seeks to enforce the covenant of the 
[assignor] to pay the purchase price, he must rely upon 
the original contract and be ready, willing, and able to 
perform it according to its terms. If the [seller] and 
assignee contract with relation to the premises in a 
manner inconsistent with the original contract and change 
the rights of the [assignor] against the [seller] or 
assignee or their obligations to each other or to the 
[assignor], it is a novation of parties to the purchase 
by means of a novation of contract. 
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Moreover, the equitable situation is that the 
assignee become primarily liable for the purchase price 
and the [assignor] is his surety. [Citation omitted.] 
It is familiar law that the obligee and principal cannot 
materially change the contract of suretyship without 
releasing the surety. 
Professor Corbin advocated the foregoing rule when he 
summarized the assignor's liability as follows: 
Nor can the assignor escape from his own duty by 
assignment of it or by delegating its performance. In 
spite of these limitations on his power, however, he may 
take comfort in the fact that there are like limitations 
upon the power of the obligor and the assignee. He 
remains bound by his original duty, as before the 
assignment; but the obligor and the assignee cannot 
without his consent change the performance that he is 
bound to render or the conditions on which he is bound 
to render it. This is obviously sound doctrine, although 
the question has not often arisen and there is little 
case authority. 
This may be illustrated by the case of a bilateral 
contract for the future sale of goods or land. The buyer 
can assign his right to the goods or land and can 
delegate performance of his duty to pay the price. He 
himself remains bound as before by his duty to pay that 
price. But observe that he remains bound "as before"; 
the assignee and the seller cannot, by agreement or by 
waiver, make it the assignor's duty to pay a different 
price or on different conditions. If the seller is 
willing to make such a change, he must trust to the 
assignee alone. 
4 Corbin on Contracts. § 866 at p. 458. 
The Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract makes a number of 
material changes from the terms in the original Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, any one of which is sufficient to release Welch from his 
obligations as assignor/surety. (R. 210, "Exhibit Hlf.) The most 
significant changes are: 
20 
1. Adding $7,000 to the price that was due under the 
original Uniform Real Estate Contract as a penalty charge as a 
condition to Stone regaining his ownership interest in the real 
property. (R. 210, "Exhibit H", Paragraph 4.) 
2. The addition of another $3,000 to the price that was due 
under the original Uniform Real Estate Contract in lieu of the 
payment of $1,500 of costs incurred by the Faulkners as a condition 
of Stoned regaining his interest in the property. (R. 210, 
"Exhibit H", Paragraph 5.) 
3. An agreement making it a default (resulting in 
acceleration of the entire balance due) for Stone or any subsequent 
assignor to assign the buyer's interest in the contract without 
placing a quit claim deed from the assignee into escrow. (R. 210, 
"Exhibit H", Paragraph 3.) 
4. An agreement limiting plaintiffs' remedy upon default to 
forfeiture of the buyer's interest in the subject real property. 
(R. 210, "Exhibit H", Paragraph 3.) 
The amended contract substantially changes, to Welch's 
detriment, the obligations and liabilities of the buyer from those 
in the original Uniform Real Estate Contract. The changes 
increased the burden on Stone and increased the likelihood that he 
would default. These material changes, made without Welch's 
consent, prejudice Welch and require that he be discharged from 
further liability under the original Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
(R. 200, Welch Affidavit, 5 4.) Since Welch is not a party to the 
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Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract, he has no obligations under 
it. 
IV 
A Person*s Right to Bring an Action to 
Remove a Cloud on Title and Right to Have 
Title Issues Determined By a Jury Are 
Irrelevant to the Issues Before the Court 
The action from which this appeal has been taken is an action 
to recover delinquent installments the Faulkners claim are due them 
under the Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract. The complaint 
seeks neither title to the subject apartments nor adjudication of 
any alleged cloud on title to the apartments,, Further, Welch has 
no interest in the apartments. Welch stands ready to give the 
Faulkners, should they request it, a Quit Claim Deed to the 
property to confirm what the summary judgment has already 
established — Welch has no interest in the apartments.5 
Summary judgment was granted in this case to avoid an 
unnecessary jury trial. The material facts are not in dispute and 
Welch was and is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of 
law. There is not need for a jury trial; the Faulkners have not 
been deprived of their day in court or their right to a jury trial. 
Under the terms of the original Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, upon the Faulkners1 forfeiture of the buyer's interest, 
the apartments became Faulkners1 alone. (R. 210, "Exhibit A", 
Paragraph 16A.) 
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V 
The Faulkners complied With the Forfeiture 
Provisions of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
and Even if They Had Not, Having Taken Possession 
of the Property, They Cannot Now Avoid a Forfeiture 
Based on Their Own Acts of Noncompliance 
In a vain attempt to avoid the consequences of their 
intentional forfeiture of the buyer's interest under the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract, the Faulkners seek refuge in the body of law 
developed to protect buyers from unreasonable forfeitures. There 
is not shelter for them there for two reasons. First, the 
Faulkners complied with the notice requirements of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract's forfeiture provision. Second, the rules 
developed to protect buyers from unreasonable forfeitures cannot 
be used to relieve a seller of the consequence of a forfeiture 
accepted by the buyer. 
In this case, the Faulkners followed the forfeiture procedure 
in the Uniform Real Estate Contract to the letter. This is not a 
situation like those in cases relied upon by the Faulkners in their 
brief. The Faulkners gave the notice of default expressing their 
intention to forfeit the buyer's interest as required by the 
contract and followed it up with a second notice indicating that 
they had forfeited the buyer's interest in accordance with their 
previously expressed intention. The first notice was the notice 
of default sent by the escrow agent and countersigned by Nick 
Faulkner. It contained the specific amount to be paid and gave a 
reasonable time, as provided in the contract, to cure the default. 
The second notice was the notice that the escrow agreement had been 
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terminated and the escrowed documents delivered to the Faulkners, 
also sent by the escrow agent and countersigned by the Faulkners. 
Certainly, after the Faulkners demanded and Stone voluntarily 
surrendered possession of the subject apartments, there was no 
doubt about the Faulkners having forfeited the buyer's interest or 
buyer's understanding regarding the forfeiture. 
Even if the Faulkners had not technically complied with the 
requirements for forfeiture under the Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
they cannot rely on their own failures to evade the consequences 
of a forfeiture accepted by the buyer. It is one thing to permit 
an objecting buyer to avoid the loss of his interest in the 
property based on the seller's failure to strictly comply with the 
requirements of the contract, and quite another to allow the seller 
to rely on his own failure to comply with the contract in a belated 
attempt to avoid the consequences of having in fact forfeited the 
buyer's interest. There is no reason to permit the seller to 
avoid the consequence of his actions based on defenses the buyer 
may have had to the seller's forfeiture, particularly when the 
seller's exercise of the forfeiture provision has been acquiesced 
in by the buyer and possession of the property has been surrendered 
to the seller, as here. Otherwise, the seller could rely on his 
own mistakes as a basis for belated rescission of forfeitures 
acquiesced in by the buyer, upon deciding that some other remedy 
would be more advantageous. In this case the Faulkners seek to 
avoid the consequences of a forfeiture completed in January 1982, 
with respect to an action filed in June 1988. 
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VI 
The Cases Relied Upon By the Faulkners 
in the Memorandum Included in the Addendum 
to Their Brief Are Inapposite 
The Addendum to the Faulkners' brief contains a copy of the 
memorandum submitted by them to the trial court below in opposition 
to Welch's motion for summary judgment, apparently included as 
additional argument in support of their appeal. A response to the 
argument in that memorandum isf therefore, appropriate. 
In the memorandum submitted below, the Faulkners cited only 
one case involving an election to forfeit the buyer's interest 
under an installment real estate contract — Keesee v. Fetzek, 106 
Idaho App. 507, 681 P.2d 600 (1984). They cited it for the 
proposition that absent prejudice to the buyer they are entitled 
to "change remedies" at any time, thereby avoiding the effects of 
their forfeiture of the buyer's interest under the terms of the 
Uniform Real Estate Code involved in this case. In so arguing, the 
Faulkners ignore the distinction expressly made in the Keesee case 
between the result when there has been a mere expression of an 
intent to default, which will bind the electing seller only if 
relied upon by the buyer to this prejudice, and the actual 
forfeiture of the contract by an act in accordance with the express 
intention, which without more terminates the contract and forfeits 
the buyer's interest. As the distinction drawn by the court in 
the Keesee case shows, a seller cannot act in accordance with his 
expressed intention to forfeit without being bound by it. By 
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acting in accordance with his expressed intention the seller 
executes the forfeiture. Id. at 605. 
In Keesee. the seller sent a notice of default to the buyer 
which stated that if the buyer's default was not cured within the 
time providedf that the seller had elected to terminate the 
contract. When the default was not cured, the seller did not 
demand possession and did not demand return of the documents held 
in escrow under the terms of the real estate contract. Insteadf 
the seller filed suit seeking judgment for the unpaid balance. Id. 
at 602. Under these circumstances the court held that the seller 
would not be bound to his expressed intention to forfeit, absent 
prejudice to the buyer who had remained in possession of the 
property. But, the language in Keesee shows that under the facts 
present here, the Keesee court would conclude that the contract had 
been forfeited because the Faulkners went beyond a mere expression 
of intention to forfeit here, and in fact completed the forfeiture 
by their conduct. 
In distinguishing, Ellis v. Butterfield. 98 Idaho 644, 570 
P.2d 1334 (1977), where the seller was held to have forfeited the 
buyer's interest, the Keesee court said at page 605: 
Ellis is factually distinguishable from the instant 
case in regard to the relationship between the notices 
given to the buyers and the sellers' conduct thereafter. 
Our research reveals that the Ellis notice stated, in 
part: 
[The sellers are] giving you thirty days 
written notice of intention to terminate our 
agreement of Sale for failure to pay 
installments due. If all back payments are 
not made within thirty days, we will terminate 
this contract and have you removed from the 
property. [Clerk's Record at 20.] 
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That notice, like the notice given in the present casef 
referred to a future act by the sellers. In Ellis such 
action was taken — escrow papers were withdrawn and 
possession was demanded. The forfeiture was complete. 
But in the present casef there was no such action by the 
sellers. They decided to seek other remedies in court. 
The facts in this case are like those in Ellis. In this case 
the Faulkners have also acted on their expressed intention to 
forfeit. Indeed, in this case the Faulkners' acts go beyond those 
described as being sufficient in Ellis. In addition to sending a 
notice of default, terminating the escrow and demanding possession, 
the Faulkners actually took possession of the property. 
Significantly, the only remedy under the contract pursuant to which 
the Faulkners could take possession without suit was by forfeiture. 
Moreover, unlike the Keesee case, here there has been 
prejudice to buyer's interest as a result of the Faulkners' 
conduct. As a matter of law, Welch and the other assignors and 
assignees of the buyer's interest were prejudiced when the 
Faulkners took possession of the property and began collecting the 
rents. Nothing could be more contrary and injurious to the buyer's 
ownership interest in the property. 
A word also needs to be said about the Faulkners' guotation 
from the Jacobsen case cited in the memorandum submitted below as 
being at 79 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1969). There is no Jacobsen case at 
that citation or elsewhere in that volume of the California 
Reporter. There is, however, a case containing the language quoted 
which is styled Gantner v. Johnson. 79 Cal. Rptr. 381 (App. 1969). 
But the quotation apparently taken from the Gantner case is out of 
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context in two senses. First, it is a quotation from the headnote 
prepared by the reporting service and not from the text of the case 
itself. Second, it is misleading because the Gantner case did not 
involve a situation where the seller had even so much as expressed 
an intention to forfeit the buyer1s interest. Instead, the seller 
had from the beginning expressed his intention that the buyers 
would be bound by the contract and that the seller always 
considered the contract to be in effect. Id. at 3 85. The sellers 
in Gantner were in possession by reason of their having purchased 
an interest in the property, not pursuant to any declaration of 
forfeiture or termination of the purchase contract. 
In the memorandum submitted below, the Faulkners take the 
novel position, without citing any authority, that they can 
negotiate a new agreement with a buyer's assignee (Stone in this 
case), without releasing the buyer (Welch in this case) from the 
old agreement. The Faulkners assert there was no harm to Welch by 
the increase in the purchase price Stone was to pay and the other 
changes under the new agreement because they say Welch's obligation 
continued under the old agreement and so was not changed. 
Plaintiffs misperceive both the effect of the change in the terms 
of the agreement and the nature of Welch's obligations as an 
assignor. 
Welch was prejudiced by the changes made by the amended 
contract, whether or not personally obligated, because the changes 
made Stone's performance more burdensome and increased the 
likelihood that he would default. Stone was obviously having 
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Sanctions should Be imposed Because the 
Faulkners1 Appeal is Frivolous, It Being 
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damages and single or double costs, including attorney fees, to the 
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prevailing party." The Faulkners have failed to demonstrate that 
there is any basis whatsoever, in fact or in law, for their appeal 
of the trial court's judgment• The appeal is frivolous. As a 
result, both Welch and this Court have been required to expend time 
and money, unnecessarily. The Appellants should, therefore, be 
required to pay Welch's costs and the reasonable attorneys' fees 
incurred in defending the trial court's judgment on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Welch requests that the trial court's summary judgment be 
affirmed and that the Faulkners' appeal be dismissed, and that he 
be awarded his costs and a reasonable attorneys' fee. The 
undisputed material facts establish that the only real estate 
contract under which Welch ever had any obligations to the 
Faulkners was terminated by the Faulkners' forfeiture of the 
buyer's interest under the contract, and by the Faulkners* entry 
into a new and different agreement with Welch's assignee with 
respect to the subject apartments. Welch is not a party to the 
Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract under which the Faulkners have 
sued to recover delinquent installment payments. Accordingly, 
Welch has no liability to the Faulkners. 
Respectfully submitted this r-Z^Tfi day of October, 1990. 
WORKMAN, NYDEGGER & JENSEN 
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3 l. I am a defendant in this action. 
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This is tn certlfv that the foirpqojnq Affidavit if Tlmm* 
K ' Il I In ii in PI I in in l In fjarl les hereto by nidi I in a J l iu 
copy thereof, postage prepaid this , '' day of May, 1989, LJ the 
following: 
uaie M. Dorius, Esq. 
P. O. Box U 
,!9 South Main Street 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Attorney for Plainti ffs 
Donald C. Hughes, Jr 
r>20 26th Street, Suite 
i >gden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Defendant Paul - Stone 
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L. R. Gardiner, Jr. (A-1148) 
Thomas R. Vuksinick (A-3341) 
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER 
50 South Main Street 
Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 533-0066 
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas K. Welch 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
NICK FAULKNER and KARYL ) 
FAULKNER, his wife, ) 
vs. 
TOM C. 
STONE 
THOMAS 
vs. 
PAUL W 
STATE 1 
COUNTY 
Plaintiffs, ) 
THORPE, PAUL W. ) 
and THOMAS K. WELCH, ) 
Defendants. ) 
K. WELCH, ) 
Cross-plaintiff, ) 
. STONE, j 
Cross-defendant. ) 
DF UTAH , ) 
OF \lt/\ tk i 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL W. STONE 
Civil No. 2698-88 
t#"«* 
ss 
Paul W. Stone, being first sworn, deposes and says as 
follows: 
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1. I am Paul W. Stone, also known as Paul Stone, and am a 
defendant and cross-defendant in this action. 
2. On or about November 22, 1978, Thomas K. Welch, also 
known as Tom Welch, assigned to me his buyer's interest in a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract dated April 8, 1978, between Nick 
and Karyl Faulkner as sellers and Tom C. Thorpe as buyer. A 
true and correct copy of the Uniform Real Estate Contract dated 
April 8, 1978, between the Faulkners and Thorpe is attached as 
Exhibit "A." A true and correct copy of the written assignment 
of contract bearing my signature is attached as Exhibit "B." 
3. The real property that is the subject of the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract is comprised of two eight plexes located in 
Washington Terrace, Utah. 
4. After the buyer's interest in the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract was assigned to me I began making payments directly to 
the Faulkners as sellers through Weber Valley Bank, the escrow 
agent under the contract. 
5. On July 1, 1981.. Arealtech Realty (property management) 
owned by Lynn Muirbrook was hired to manage the apartments. The 
management agreement was terminated on or about February 1, 
1982. 
6. My November 1981 payment to the Faulkners was late. 
Shortly after November 30, 1981, 1 received a notice of default 
bearing that date from the Faulkners through the escrow agent. 
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The notice demanded that the default be cured and stated that in 
the event the default was not cured, the Faulkners had elected 
remedy "A" under paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. That paragraph provides under remedy "A" that in the 
event default is not cured within 5 days after notice, the 
buyer's interest under the contract is forfeited to the seller 
as liquidated damages. This default was cured. A true and 
correct copy of the notice of default is attached as 
Exhibit "C." 
7. My January 1982 payment was late. Shortly after 
January 25, 1982, I received notice of default bearing that date 
from the Faulkners, again through the escrow agent. The notice 
demanded that the default be cured by February 1, 1982, and 
again elected the remedy of forfeiture under paragraph 16A of 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract in the event the default was 
not cured. I was unable to cure the default by February 1, 
1982. A true and correct copy of that notice of default is 
attached as Exhibit "D." 
8. In the first part of February 1982 I received a letter 
dated February 1, 1982, from Weber Valley Bank as the escrow 
agent under the Uniform Real Estate Contract. That letter 
notified me, among other things, that the escrow had been term-
inated and the documents held in escrow had been delivered to 
the Faulkners. A true and correct copy of that letter is 
attached as Exhibit "E." 
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9. On or about February 1, 1982, the Faulkners sent a 
letter to the tenants of the real property being purchased under 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract that advised them to remit 
their rental payments to the Faulkners as owners of the 
property. 
10. The February 1982 rentals that had been collected by 
me and the management company that had been managing the real 
property for me were paid over to the Faulkners, and Nick 
Faulkner collected some of the February 1982 rentals himself. A 
copy of a list of those rental payments in Nick Faulkner's hand-
writing is attached as Exhibit "F." 
11. I also turned my rent ledger for the real property 
over to the Faulkners in February 1982. 
12. Between February 1, 1982, and May 27, 1982, I entered 
into negotiations with the Faulkners in an effort to regain my 
interest in the forfeited real property. During those negoti-
ations Nick Faulkner repeatedly said that the Faulkners owned 
the property and were entitled to the rents. During this time 
the Faulkners collected all of the rents from the real property 
in an amount totaling over $12,000. The rents collected are 
summarized in the document written and signed by Nick Faulkner, 
a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit "G." 
13. At no time did Thomas K. Welch or Tom C. Thorpe par-
ticipate in my negotiations with the Faulkners to regain my 
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interest in the real property, nor were they mentioned as part 
of the negotiations. 
14. In late May 1982, the Faulkners and I reached an 
agreement pursuant to which I would regain my interest in the 
real property on the terms set forth in the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract except as changed by an agreement dated May 28, 1982. 
A true and correct copy of the May 28, 1982, agreement con-
taining the changes is attached as Exhibit "H." Among the 
significant changes in the agreement was the imposition of a 
$7,000 "penalty" to be added to the principal balance due and an 
additional $3,000 added to the principal in lieu of immediate 
payment of $1,500 in "out of pocket costs" that the Faulkners 
required be paid as a condition to regaining my interest in the 
real property. The terms regarding the Faulkners' remedy in the 
event of default were also changed. Under the new agreement 
between the Faulkners and myself, in the event I was unable to 
make the payments when due, the Faulkners' sole remedy was for-
feiture of the buyer's interest. There was to be no other 
remedy under the new purchase agreement. See paragraphs 
numbered 3, 4 and 5 of the May 28, 1982, agreement, attached as 
Exhibit "H." 
15. A new escrow agreement was entered into with Weber 
Valley Bank, the Faulkners and me as part of the new purchase 
agreement. A true and correct copy of the escrow agreement is 
attached as Exhibit "I." 
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16. As part of the new agreement with the Faulkners, I 
also required that they notify the tenants of the real property 
that I had regained my interest in the property. To that end, 
Nick Faulkner signed and delivered to me a notice to be passed 
on to the tenants dated May 27, 1982, a true and correct copy of 
which is attached as Exhibit "J." I then began making payments 
into the new escrow account as provided in my agreement with the 
Faulkners. 
17. In June 1988, the Faulkners initiated the suit seeking 
to recover the possession of the real property and to collect 
payments toward the balance owed under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. 
DATED this Z / day of March, 1989. 
' gg^c^-^C^" r-fO 
13 ^aul W. Stone 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this <=>{/ day of March, 19 
20.. 
1989 
2111 ^^^7~-^)l 
ccj<Ajy 
23 
24 I Mv commission expires: 
tQi&c NOTARX--38BLIC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that the foregoing Affidavit of Paul W. 
Stone, A/K/A Paul Stone was served upon the parties hereto by 
mailing a true and correct copy thereof this / S day of Ma*eh, 
1989, to the following: 
Dale M. Dorius, Esq. 
P. 0. Box U 
29 South Main Street 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Donald C. Hughes, Jr. 
520 26th Street, Suite 206 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Defendant Paul W. Stone 
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Exhibit A 
I 
THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT IF NOT UNOfcRSIOOO SEU COMPETENT ADVICE 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
1 THIS AGREEMENT. made in duplicate this 8 t h day of fibril A - D - l 9 ' " • 
by and betwaan N I C K FAULKNER a n d KARYL FAULKNER. h i 3 W i f e 
hereinafter designated as the Seller, and TQM C . THORPE _ 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of C Q U A t Y Qt W . h . s 7 i fiffltff O f U t a h 
2 WITNESSETH That the Seller, for the consideration herein menUoned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following deacnoed real property, situate in 
the county of -
Weber suta of Utah, to-wit. 310 W, 50QQ S o , — O q d e n , Utah 
Aooasaa 
More particularly described as follows. 
SEE EXHIBIT "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND MADE A PART HEREOF. 
II 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of Thf f i t? 
Hundred Forty Thousand and no/100 Dollars <i34Q,QQQ.Qft 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order WfihPT V a l l e y R a n k , F . S C m W n p p f , 
stric .y within the following times, tn mtFOTty FflllT ThflllSaraa U q f r t B U I Y ^ * 1 & n o / l f o 4 4 . 8 0 0 . 0 0 t 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged* and the balance of j f ' aUall be paid as follows: 
Payments of $2,500.00 or more per month beginning May 10, 1978 at 
§2,500.00 or more on or before the 10th day of each and every month 
thereafter until April 10, 1988 at which time the entire unpaid principal 
and interest shall be due and payable. In addition to the above monthl^i 
payments annual principal payments of $5,000.00 shall be due the 10th 
day of each and every May beginning May 10, 1379. Weber Valley Bank is1 
instructed and authorized to reduce the principal balance by $5,000*00 
on May 10, 1979, $5,000.00 on May 10, 1980 and $5,000.00 on May 10, 198|L| 
P&LlS&fc £SS&U& SL &&Jrl,m»9Qn payments. iQtfc,
 of April lfJJ_ 
4. Said monthly payment* are to be applied /irst to the payment oi interest *ad mcond to the reduction oi the 
principal. Iaterest shall be charged from ftpf1^- ^ r T 9 7R - on all unpaid portions oi the 
purchase price at the rate of per cent ( 9 , 7 5 </f) p a r K n n u m . The Buyer, at his option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract oy the ttuyei herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or m prepayment of future 
installment* at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment m maue. 
5 It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts puyment from the Buyer on this contract le»* than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller 
6. U \* understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property u» favor of S t a f f * fi fWT THgS 
a n d L o a n a n d J o e H, B a r t p with an unpaid balaoca of 
I , as of _ 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
fees now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following NO e x c e p t i o n s 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to *.»*»«..! percent 
( %) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments, piovided that the agrregate monthly installment 
pa>menu required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subje*.. to said loans and mortgages. 
U. If the Buyer desiies to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obit' 
gallons outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it &hall be the Buyers obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligation* Prepayment penalties in respect 
to obligations against saiu properly incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, »iull be puid by seller unless 
said obligations are eusumed or approved by buyer. 
10. Ihe Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount as tan be necured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon 
the purchase puce above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses neceasary in ob-
taining »aid loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half provided however, that the monthly pay menu and 
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above. 
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments o( eveiv kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agreea 
that there are no eaaessments against said premises except the following. 
Weber pasin Water Conservancy District and Central Weber Sewer 
Improvement District 
The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the payment of his obligations against said property. 
12. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes aiter A p r i l ^Q » 1 9 7 8 
13. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a com* 
peny acceptable to the Seller in the amount ot not less than the unpaid balance on this eontreet. or I —,, . •• •• 
and to assign said insurance to the Seller as his interest* may appear and to deliver th» insurance policy to nlm. 
14. In the event the Buyer snail default in the payment of any special or general taxes, usseaaments or insurance 
premiums as herein provided, the beller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either 
of them, and it Seller elecu ao to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, ail such sums so advanced 
and paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of ^ of. one percent per 
month until paid. 
16. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or'upon 
said premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition. 
16. in the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make 
any payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within f j f t e e n days thereafter, the 
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies: 
A. Seller shall have the nght, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice, 
to be released from aii obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments wmch have 
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller ss liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take 
possession of said premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with all improve-
ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements snail remain with 
the land become the property ot the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for ail delinquent instaiimenU, including coat* and attorneys 
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the beller, at his option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of 
the State oi Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may nave a judgment for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment cf s receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and 
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the name pursuant 
to order of the court, and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, snail be entitled to the possession 
of the said premises during the period of redemption. 
17 It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement. 
18 In the event there are any hens or encumbrances against said premises other thsn those herein provided for or 
referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the 
same by acts or neglect of the beller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit 
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
menu herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such suspended 
payment* shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
19. The SeUer on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the 
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued 
by or through the acu or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time ot sale or at any time during the 
term of this agreement, or at time oi delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer. 
20. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyeir accept* the said property 
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto N o n e 
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreement* contained here* 
In, that the defaulting party shall pay aii costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorneys fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession ot the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise. 
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, suc-
cessors, end assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their names, the day and year 
first above written. 
ad/t 
^ - J ^ r <"s fl*/2*. 
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EXHIBIT MAM 
PARCEL I: Part of the Northwest Quarter Ndrthwest Quarter of 
SEction 17, Township 5 North, Range 1 Westi, Salt Lake Meridian, 
U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point North 8St057' West 195 feet 
and North 0°22* East 99 feet from the Southeast Corner of 
said Northwest Quarter of Northwest Quarter Section, running 
thence North 89°57l West 107 feet, thence (North 84 feet 
paralleling the West boundary of said Nortjhwest Quarter-
Northwest Quarter Section, thence West lQCf feet paralleling 
the South boundary of said Northwest Quarter - Northwest 
Quarter Section, thence North 0°58l East 9tl feet, thence 
East 190 feet paralleling the South boundary of said Northwest 
Quarter-Northwest Quarter Section, thence South 0°22* West 
80 feet, thence South 89°38l East 17 feet;| thence South 95 
feet to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL II: A part of the Northwest Quarter* of the Northwest 
Quarter of Section 17, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt 
Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey: Beginning at a| point 33 feet 
North and 195 feet West of the Southeast Corner of the 
Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter^ 
of Section 17, thence Westerly 107 feet, (paralleling the 
South boundary of said Northwest Quarter at Northwest Quarter 
of Section 17, thence Northerly 66 feet, paralleling the 
East boundary of said Northwest Quarter o£ Northwest Quarter 
of Section 17, thence Easterly 107 feet, paralleling the 
said South boundary of Northwest Quarter of Northwest Quarter 
of Section 17, thence Southerly 66 feet paralleling the said 
East boundary of Northwest Quarter of the {Northwest Quarter 
of Section 17, to the point of beginning. 
EXHIBIT MB" 
The above payment includes taxes and insurance which shall 
be paid by the Seller and added to the contract balance as paid. 
Should the taxes and/or insurance increase the payment herein 
shall be increased accordingly. A late penalty of 5% shall be 
charged on any payment 10 days or more past due. 
Buyer 
Buyer 
Exhibit B 
ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT 
THIS AGREEMENT, mod© in the City of O g d e n , State of Utah on the . ? . 2 M 
•Jl£y2L5LfiS.E. 19.Z.1. by and between 
hereinafter referred to as tho assignors, ond 
hereinafter referred to os the assignees, 
p aii 1* **S tone" 
... day of 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, under date of .....Au^US t _ 2 ^ _ # 19...2.8 J j 
~.«. ............. os seiiers, entered into Q 
Pom Welch 
M&fiffigflSiS? Contract with 
as buyers, of Z . L # C , , Utah, which contract is delivered herewith, wherein and wnereby the said seiiers 
agreed to seii ond the said buyers agreed to purchase, upon the terms, conditions, and provisions therein S4t 
forth, aii that certain land, with the building* and improvements thereon, erected, situate, lying and being in 
the County of ^ .e .ber „ s l a t # 0 f Utah, and more particularly described as foilowst 
SEE ArTACHED 
to which agreement in writing, reference is hereby made for all of the forms, conditions and provisions 
thereof, and 
WHEREAS, the assignees desire to acquire trom trie assignors aii of the right, title and Interest of the 
assignors in ond to the said written agreement. 
NOW, THEREFORE, It is hereby mutually agreed as foilowst 
1. That the assignors in consideration of the Payment of Ten Dollars and other good and valuable 
consideration, tho receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, assign to the assignee*, aii their right, title ond 
interest in and to the aforesaid Uniform Real Estate Contract of AVi£Vi.§..U...?.Z, 19.2.$.., concerning the 
above described property. 
2. That to induce the assignees to pay the said sum of money and to accept the said contract, the as* 
signors hereby represent to the assignees a% follows* 
a. That the assignors have duly performed ail the condition* of the taid contract. 
b. That the contract is now in full force and effect and that the unpaid balance of said contract is 
$^2^ . ! . i t7 . f t . -J .9 with interest paid to the ...J.Q.tJl day of . . J t a V a a L t e X , 19.2&.. 
3. That in consideration of the assignors executing and delivering this agreement, the assignees cove-
nant with the ossignors as foilowst 
a. That the assignees will duly keep, observe and perform all of the terms, conditions and provisions 
of the said agreement that af to be kept, observed and performed by the assignors. 
b. That the assignees will save and hold harmless the assignors of and from any and all actions, suits, 
costs, damages, claims ond demands whatsoever arising by reason of an act or omission of the 
assignees. 
IN WITNESS WHcRcOF, The parties hereto have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year 
first above written. 
luViOiO-
EXHIBIT MA" 
PARCEL I: Part of the Northwest Quarter Northwest Quarter of 
SEction 17, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point North a9°57' West 195 feet 
and North 0°22' East 99 feet from the Southeast Corner of 
said Northwest Quarter of Northwest Quarter Section, running 
thence North 89°57' West 107 feet, thence North 84 feet 
paralleling the West boundary of said Northwest Quarter-
Northwest Quarter Section, thence West 100 feet paralleling 
the South boundary of said Northwest Quarter - Northwest 
Quarter Section, thence North O ^ 1 East 91 feet, thence 
East 190 feet paralleling the South boundary of said Northwest 
Quarter-Northwest Quarter Section, thence South 0°22' West 
80 feet, thence South 89038' East 17 feet; thence South 95 
feet to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL II: A part of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest 
Quarter of Section 17, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt 
Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point 33 feet 
North and 195 feet West of the Southeast Corner of the 
Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter 
of Section 17, thence Westerly 107 feet, paralleling the 
South boundary of said Northwest Quarter of Northwest Quarter 
of Section 17, thence Northerly 66 'feet, paralleling the 
East boundary of said Northwest Quarter of Northwest Quarter 
of Section 17, thence Easterly 107 feet, paralleling the 
said South boundary of Northwest Quarter of Northwest Quarter 
of Section 17, thence Southerly 66 feet paralleling the said 
East boundary of Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter 
of Section 17, to the point of beginning. 
Exhibit C 
P O B O X 9 7 2 9 • 2 9 1 0 W A S H I N G T O N B O U L E V A R D • O C O E N . U T A H 1 4 4 0 1 
"THIS IS A FORMAL DEMAND, PLACED ON YOUR ESCROW ACCOUNT BY THE 
CONTRACT SELLER, YOUR IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO THE FOLLOWING RE-
QUIREMENTS IS MANDATORY IF YOU WISH TO RETAIN AN INTEREST IN 
THE PROPERTY INVOLVED," 
Dated: Nov. 30, 1981 
**** Mr. Stone, 
Demand has been placed on this bank by the seller on your Escrow Contract for the 
release of the documents held by us, which secure your interest in the property 
you have purchased from Nick Faulkner This notice has been sent 
to you pursuant to the requirements of your Note/Contract, and of Utah State Law. 
You are hereby notified that your agreement is in default at this time, for the 
following reason(s): 
1 X 1 Payment on your Escrow Account # 353 has not yet been received by the 
seller or by this office for the month(s) of Nov, 1981 . 
The interest on the account has been paid through Oct. 1981 This is a default 
of paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract (or of the contractual obli-
gations of the Note) on file here. The seller has chosen option A
 0f the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract (or the remedy outlined in the Note) in order to have this 
default in payment satisfied. YOU MUST REMEDY THIS DEFAULT BY REMITTING THE AMOUNT 
OF $ 2,650.00 This includes the payments currently outstanding, plus late 
fees and a demand fee of $ 25.00 . (Or, if option C has been chosen, this amount 
signifies the entire outstanding balance of the contract plus all fees or unpaid 
charges). Unless the above mentioned total is remitted to Weber Valley Bank at 
2910 Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah so as to be in our possession for processing 
no later than 3 o'clock p.m. on Dec. 7, 1981 the documents held 
in our files will be turned over to the seller on contract, the Escrow will be 
terminated, and legal action will be taken by the seller, which could result in 
your complete loss of the property involved. 
I I We have not received proof that the property involved in your Escrow Account 
* — — *
s
 properly insured. This is a violation of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, paragraph 13 ( or the requirements of your Note). You must remedy this 
default by supplying this office with a copy of your insurance policy within _ _ _ _ 
days of the date of this letter. If we have not received proper proof of insurance 
by . the seller will proceed to satisfy this demand by 
other means. 
• The seller on your contract is under the opinion that you have allowed the 
property to become run-down, violating paragraph 15 of the Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract (or the requirements of your Note). You must contact the seller within 
days of the date of this notice with specific plans for restoring the property to its 
former, proper estate, or the seller will proceed to satisfy this demand by other 
means. 
Signed: ^ <\~~^) 
Contract Seller Escrow Officer 
YOU MUST REMEDY THIS DEFAULT AS REQUIRED ABOVE BY 3:00 on Dec. 7th 1981 
The seller has received a copy of this notice and a copy has been retained in our fil 
EXHIBIT C 
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"THIS IS A FORMAL DEMAND, PLACED ON YOUR ESCROW ACCOUNT BY THE 
CONTRACT SELLER. YOUR IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO THE FOLLOWING RE-
QUIREMENTS IS MANDATORY IF YOU WISH TO RETAIN AN INTEREST IN 
THE PROPERTY INVOLVED/1 
Dated:
 J a n 25, 1982 
Dear Mr. Stone, 
Demand has been placed on this bank by the seller on your Escrow Contract for the 
release of the documents held by us, vhich secure your interest in the property 
you have purchased from Nick Faulkner This notice has been sent 
to you pursuant to the requirements of your Note/Contract, and of Utah State Lav. 
You are hereby notified that your agreement is in default at this time, for the 
following reason(s): 
lx i Payment on your Escrow Account # 353 has not yet been received by the 
seller or by this office for the month(s) of Jan 1982 . 
The interest on the account has been paid through 12-10-82 This is a default 
of paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract (or of the contractual obli-
gations of the Note) on file here. The seller has chosen option A of the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract (or the remedy outlined in the Note) in order to have this 
default in payment satisfied. YOU MUST REMEDY THIS DEFAULT BY REMITTING THE AMOUNT 
OF $ 2,650.00 This includes the payments currently outstanding, plus late 
fees and a demand fee of $ 25.00 (Or, if option C has been chosen, this amount 
signifies the entire outstanding balance of the contract plus all fees or unpaid 
charges). Unless the above mentioned total is remitted to Weber Valley Bank at 
2910 Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah so as to be in our possession for processing 
no later than 3 o'clock p.m. on Feb, 1. 1982 the documents held 
in our files will be turned over to the seller on contract, the Escrow will be 
terminated, and legal action will be taken by the seller, which could result in 
your complete loss of the property involved. 
1 1 We have not received proof that the property involved in your Escrow Account 
is properly insured. This is a violation of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, paragraph 13 ( or the requirements of your Note). You must remedy this 
default by supplying this office with a copy of your insurance policy within
 mmmmm_ 
days of the date of this letter. If we have not received proper proof of insurance 
by . the seller will proceed to satisfy this demand by 
other means. 
• The seller on your contract is under the opinion that you have allowed the 
property to become run-down, violating paragraph 15 of the Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract (or the requirements of your Note). You must contact the seller within _ _ 
days of the date of this notice with specific plans for restoring the property to its 
former, proper estate, or the seller will proceed to satisfy this demand by other 
means. 
Signed: 
Sltc/O '-^LAJ^IS x ^Cu^a. Q( . C.?U5te 
Contract Seller Escrow Officer 
YOU MUST REMEDY THIS DEFAULT AS REQUIRED ABOVE BY 3 ofclock on Feb. 1. 1982 
The seller has received a copy of this notice and a copy has been retains 4- ***» 
Exhibit E 
P 0 Box 9729 * 2910 Washington Boulevard * Ogden, Utah 84401 
* Escrow Department * Gary French, Officer * 
-hi-, i . n i - j . 
Dear -Di\ ^ic^, 
This will be your notiiication that Escrow # *^ -^  3. between yourself (yourselves) 
and /lA'c-^O -? ^^^iJ^r^j^^ . has officially been terminated by virtue 
ut default on your part after having been notified of obligations required in 
your note or contract which you have not fulfilled. 
Due to the termination of this contract, we find it necessary to notify you 
that no further payments are to be directed to Weber Valley Bank as your Escrow 
Agent * Any and all future comminlcation on this matter should be directed to 
the contract sellers. We have included their name(a) and address(es) for your 
convenience. 
Please note that the termination of 4in Escrow Account is NUT an action taken 
by the bank, but is an action carried out by us at the specific direction of 
the seller(s). Your lack of response to the registered letter mailed to you 
earlier concerning this matter is the reason for termination of the escrow. 
Had you responded either to this office or directly to the sellers, the termin-
ation could have been avoided. Any further communication, as directed above, 
needs to be carried out between you and your seller(s). The bank has been in-
demnified and released from all obligation in the matter. 
Please further note that any deeds or conveyances covering your interest in the 
property involved have been released to the seller(s). Your ownership of the 
property lb thereby in question. 
For your own benefit, prompt action on your part directly with your seller(s) 
will save you further and unnecessary expenses and problems. 
S e l l e r ( s ) : 
*X.k r^^ 
o Sincere ly , 
Laura L. Bute 
Escrow Dept. 
* YOUR WORKING PARTNER BANK * FEDERALLY INSURED BY THE FDIC * CLOSE Tn WIT * 
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Exhibit H 
Amended Uniform Real Estate Contract 
In reference to the Uniform Real Estate Contract between Nick Faulkner and 
Karyl Faulkner, the Sellers, and Tom C. Thorpe, who assigned his interest to Tom Welch, 
who assigned his interest to Paul W. Stone, the Buyer, dated April 8, 1978 and 
covering t.he real property located at 310 W. 5000 S., Washington Terrace, Utah, mora 
particularly described in the attached legal description that is made a part of this 
document, (see attachment). 
The undersigned Seller and Buyer hereby agree to the following 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract is.hereby ret 
ibalance as of May 10 1982 to be *293t]j9.93 
1. instated with the principal 
 293.139^93^.. 
2. The next payment is due June 10, 1982 and each 10th of the month thereafter 
until April 10, 1988, at which time the ENTIRE unpaid principal and interest 
shall be due and payable. 
3. A Quitclaim Deed is hereby place in escrow from Paul W. Stone co Nick 
Faulkner and Karyl Faulkner. If the entire amount is not paid in full on 
April 10, 1988, buyers or his assigns will lose any and all equity in the 
property when said quitclaim deed is recorded. If Buyer sells or assigns his 
interest or any part of his interest in the property to another person, the 
entire amount ... i 1 ...• t.u will be due and payable unless a Quitclaim Deed is 
placed In Escrow deeding said property from said person to Nick Faulkner and 
Karyl Faulkner. Said deed will be placed la the Escrow at Weber Valley Bank 
between Paul W. Stone and Nick Faulkner and Karyl Faulkner. 
4. It Is also understood that a penalty of $7,000 is charged for reinstatement* 
This amount has bejan added to the principle balance of the loan and is 
included in the $293,139.93 balance shown in paragraph 1. Buyers will be 
allowed to pay $5,000 cash within 3 years or on or before June 10, 1985 and 
has the principle amount reduced by $7,000 on the escrow balance.. This $5000 
reduction payment is not in lieu of any $5,000 payment due each May 10th. 
5. It la also understood that an additional $3,000 is added to the principle 
balance and Is included in the $293,139.93 balance shown in Paragraph 1. 
The'$3,000 is in lieu of receiving the $1,500 cash needed to pay "out of 
pocket" coats due 5-27-82. 
6. All other terms of the original Uniform Real Estate Contract remain the same. 
This amended Agreement, upon its execution by both parties. Is herewith made an integral 
part of the aforementioned Uniform Real Estate Contract 
Nick Faulkner Buyer Paul W. Stone / ^
Karyl Faulkner 
Witness 
Exhibit I 
ESCROW AGREEMENT WITH WEBER \flUIZY BANK 
AT 2910 VPiSHINGTCN BOULEVAFD-OGDEN, UTAH 
1. She undersigned NiCk Faulkner and ^ ^ Faulkner husband and wife 
hereinafter called "Grantor" and Paul ^tnnn 
hereinafter called "Grantee" deliver to you the documents on the property described 
herein to be held and disposed of by you in accordance with the instructions and upcn the 
terms herein set forth, and not otherwise, to all of which the undersigned agree. Said 
documents and property are as follows: 
DDCuments to Weber Valley Bank: 
Warranty Deeds (Fauiicner to Thorpe to Welch to Stone) 
Uniform Real Estate Contract (Faulkner to Thorpe)' 
Assignment Contract (Thorpe to Welch to Stone) 
Property legal description: l A d d ^ & l ! ^ ^ „ust initial) 
See Attachment Hereto and Made a Part Hereof. 
2. You are hereby authorized and instructed to deliver the above described dccunents and 
property to Graniw utoi payment to you, at the above address, for Grantor, of the total 
sum of S_2Q^ inQ Qi £y* • Principal and interest on the unpaid balance thereof at 9 3/4 % 
per'annum from the drfe^of Mav 10. 198? Payments shall be as follows: 
Payments of $2,500.00 or more per month beginning June 10, 1982 and $2,500.00 or more 
on or before the 10th day of each and every month thereafter until April 10. 1988 
at which time the entire unpaid principal and interest shall be due and payable. 
Ir addition to the above payments annual principal payments of $5,000.00 shall U 
due the 10th day of each and every May beginning May 10, 1983. The above payment 
includes taxes and insurance which shall be paid by the Seller and added to the 
contract balance as paid. Should the taxes and/or insurance increase the payment 
herein shall be increased accordingly. A late penalty of 5X shall be charged on any 
payment 10 days or more past .due. . ^  ^ ,, 
3. you are further authonzea and instructed to receive any and all payments after the above 
dates specified (due dates), excepting partial payments, which the undersigned understand 
you will not accept, providing that Grantor accepts such "late payments" under the terms of 
the contract which the undersigned have entered into. 
4. If, however, at any time prior to payment in full of principal and interest above specified, 
Grantor requests in writing for the delivery of said documents specifying in detail as grounas 
therefor, either; 
a. lhat all or any part of any payment of principal or interest Terrains unpaid and that 
the due date for which has passed; or 
b. lhat Grantee has failed to perform any specified term or condition other j£an payment 
of principal or interest encumbent on him to be performed under that certain^Sntxact made 
by and between Grantor and Grantee, dated Mav ifL 1QR7 and delivered herewith for purposes 
of indentification. Then, m such event or events, hereinafter called "defaults", you shall 
promptly mail to Grantee through the United States Mail, postage pre-paid and addressed to 
Grantee at 2180 W. 5700 S. Rov. Utah 84067 or any other such address as he may have 
cirecteo to you in writing prior to such an event, proper demand for the goods or payroent(s) 
stated by Grantor to be due and pending. It.is agreed and understood that you, as Escrow Agent, 
will not involve yourself in any collection effort or in any other way than to mail demand 
as requested by Grantor. You will be under no obligation to certify that the xtemand letter is 
received by Grantee, but simply be required to mail it from your office. If it appears by your 
records that all payments or obligations stated in said demand are fully paid or ccnplied 
with, or if not then if the same be paid or complied with before the expiration of JLhuudays 
after said demand is mailed to Grantee, and within the same time Grantee also proves to your 
satisfaction that none of the faults specified in the demand existed at the time demand was 
made, or if they did that they no longer do, Grantor's denand shall be disregarded and you sha: 
continue to hold these documents and to continue to accept payments as if demand had never beer 
placed. If not, then you may, at your discretion, deliver the documents to Grantor or withholc 
delivery of said documents until such time as your powers, rights and duties hereunder are 
settled acceptably to yourselves. 
5. it is understood by all parties hereto that you will use a 360 day interest figuring basis 
for this account. All payments, regardless of date received* will be figured frcm payment due 
date to payment due date for twelve consecutive thirty day months. No other method will be use< 
It is further acknowledge^ y the <jarties hereto that you, » Esc: Agent, do not hofl£* 
^serves for taxes and/or insurance premiums of any type, and that you will at no tune take 
»sponsibility for payment of said taxes and/or insurance premiums, or be' held accountable 
DZ any non-payment of sucn. 
It is intended by the parties hereto that the Agent's duties be solely administrative, and 
egardless of whether or not you have knowledge of any other agreements, you shall not be 
ound to any sucn agreements or the knowledge thereof. This document is your entire instruc-
lon, and you shall hold yourself, as agent, solely to the specifics of this document. 
These instructions may be altered or amended only by the written agreement of all parties. 
ou may resign as Escrow Agent at any time by notifying the parties of such resignation. Such 
esignation shall take effect as of the mailing date of the notification to the parties hereto. 
ou shall thereupon be released from all responsibilities in relation to this agreement, except 
hat of holding these documents until a successor agent can be employed by the parties. A-tine 
eriod of 30 days maximum will be allowed for such appointment, after which you may nail or 
therwise deliver all documents held directly to the Grantor (s). 
The undersigned agree to hold you harmless and indemnify you from all claims and liabilities 
,nd fees that may arise by reason of this agreement or its perfornance hereunder, excepting 
)nly acts, or failure to act made in bad faith or gross negligence on your part, and warrant 
.hat they have the authority to enter into this agreement and direct you to rely thereon. They 
urther state that if at any tune you are m receipt of conflicting instructions and/or deem 
'ourself insecure as to tne proper Method for discharging your duties hereunder, then upon 
notification to the parties of such condition, you will be ccnpletely discharged of any liabi-
.ity whatever, all responsibility for clarification and disposal being that of the undersigned. 
.0. The undersigned have paid you herewith the sum of $ 100- as your initial documentation 
fee for this account, and herewith authorize you to deduct tram payments received such annual 
servicing fee as you may require from tune to tune for the normal servicing of this account. 
fou will further be entitled to your normal fee for any assignment of interest to this account 
it the tur»e such assignment i.s presented, and you: normal fee for writing and delivering to the 
Irantee any demand xraae under paragraph 4. Said fees shall be paid as follows: 
Initial fee by Grantor j^ Grantee. Annual fee by XGrantor Grantee. Denand by Grantee. 
LI. All funds are to by distributed as follows, after collection. It is understood that you 
require three (3) full working days to disburse payment after receipt from the Grantee: 
First: to the payment of all fees and expenses encumbent to this account. 
Second: remit a check to First Security Bank #1277E, $1326.00. Balance to Grantor at 
2939 W. 1000 H. Layton, Ut MOT1 
12. The words "Grantor" and "Grantee" and all language of this document wnere there is more 
than cne grantor or grantee snail be construed as plural, and m cases where one or more are 
females the masculine shall include the feminine. The word "undersigned" refers to the Grantor 
and Grantee only and not to you. 
In WITNESS VHERBDF, the parties have executed this agreement this. 26 day of Mav 
19 82 ,
 Bt Sunset, Utah 
y£^£ -f^^LtJ^^ 
\ J GRANTORS 
State nf Utah 
f^z2j?jz/.A^. 
County of Davis 
On this, the 26 day of May 
and Karyl Faulkner, Paul M. Stone 
1982 
GRANTEES 
before me personally appeared Nick Fatt ier 
. known to me to be 
tne person{s) wnose name(s) subscribed to tne foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me 
that:Hhe3_executed tne same. IN WITNESS WHEKEDF, I have set my hand and affixed my official 
set nereunto on the day and year above mentioned. 
My Commission p*pires Pec« IS, 1983 
Notary Public for_ 
Residing at.J22vAs ounty 
The undersigned at Weber Valley Bank in Ogden, Utah hereby/ 
ments described in tne foregoing agreement as initiated, 
nold and dispose of the same in accordance with the/instri 
agreement. 
Accepted on WftV 2 8 ^
 at Qgden, Utah 
e £ receipt of the docu-
lf of the bank to 
the terms of said 
jValiey S^nx-Escrow Department 
Exhibit J 
May 27, 1982 
The two eight plexes located at 310 W. 5000 S. Washington Terrace have 
been reinstated to Paul W. Stone who is now the owner, manager of said unit 
as of the date of this letter. All management needs, renting, repairs problems 
are to be directed to Paul W. Stone. 
Dated _ ^ j U^ '&usflk«ss<J 
Nick Faulkner 
r v U T D T T T 
Tab 3 
•hA 
NICK FAULKNER and KARYL Y 
FAULKNER, his wife, T RULING ON DEFENDANT 
THOMAS WELCH'S MOTION 
Plaintiffs, 1 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. T 
TOM C. THORPE, PAUL W. STONE ) Case No. 880902698 
and THOMAS K. WELCH, T 
Defendants. ) 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Thomas 
K. Welch's Motion for Summary Judgment does not contain a 
statement of fact that plaintiff's contend are disputed. To 
start with argument stating, "Defendant Welch is still liable 
under the contract because plaintiff never received title back 
to the propery and the contract was reinstated.11; plaintiff's 
Memorandum is supported by Affidavit of Nick Faulkner and Karyl 
Faulkner. Defendant Welch moved for an order striking all of 
paragraph five (5) of plaintiff's Affidavit except the portion 
of the Affidavit where plaintiff's admit they took possession of 
the property subject to the Uniform Real Estate Contract on the 
basis that it fails to set forth facts that would be admissible 
in evidence and instead states conclusions, including legal 
conclusions not supported by facts. 
RULING 
Faulkner v. Thorpe et al 
Case No. 880902698 
Page 2 
Generalized conclusory affidavits in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment do not create a genuine factual 
dispute that will preclude summary judgment. Also, in response 
to interrogatories of defendant Welch's first set of 
interrogatories, plaintiff stated under oath that they actually 
received the documents which were in escrow about the time they 
sent the Notice of Default and Forfeiture. The Affidavit is 
inconsistent with the answer to the interrogatory and there is 
no explanation for the inconsistency. Therefore, paragraph five 
(5) of the Affidavit is stricken for failure to meet the 
requirement of Rule 56(e), except plaintiff's admission that 
they entered into possession of the subject property. 
The facts appear that Welch assigned the buyer's interest 
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract to the defendant Stone. 
As a result of Stone's default under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract plaintiff sent a Notice of Default in which they 
selected forfeiture in liquidated damages as their remedy if the 
default were not cured. When the default was not cured, 
plaintiffs terminated the escrow, received the documents in 
escrow and sent notice to Stone that the* escrow had been 
terminated. Plaintiffs took possession of the property without 
suit and began collecting rents. At a later date, plaintiffs 
entered into a new agreement with Stone. The only remedy under 
RULING 
Faulkner v. Thorpe et al 
Case No. 880902698 
Page 3 
the contract under which the plaintiffs could take possession 
without suit was by forfeiture. On plaintiffs negotiating a new 
agreement with Welch as assignee, the original contract was 
replaced and Welch was released. 
Defendant Welch's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
DATED this '' ~ of July, 1989. 
/ 
j^rtZ/f-F^L. dU J 
RONALD O. HYDE, Judge
 t I 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the r day of July, 1989 I 
sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to counsel 
as follows: 
Dale M. Dorius 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
29 South Main Street 
Brigham City, Utah 84 3 02 
L. R. Gardiner, Jr. 
Attorney for Defendant Welch 
50 South Main Street Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Donald C. Hughes, Jr. 
Attorney for Defendant Stone 
520 Twenty Sixth Street Suite 206 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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L. R. Gardiner, Jr. (A-1148) 
Thomas R. Vuksinick (A-3341) 
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER 
50 South Main Street 
Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 533-0066 
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas K. Welch 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUL 1 8 1989 
NICK FAULKNER and KARYL 
FAULKNER, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TOM C. THORPE, PAUL W. 
STONE and THOMAS K. WELCH, 
Defendants. 
THOMAS K. WELCH, 
Cross-plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAUL W. STONE, 
Cross-defendant. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 88090-2698 
The motion of defendant Thomas K. Welch for summary 
judgment in his favor and against the defendants and the related 
motion of defendant Welch to strike certain portions of the 
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affidavit of Nick Faulkner having been submitted to the Court 
for consideration pursuant to Rule 4-501, Chapter 4 of the 
Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration, and the Court 
having considered the memorandums and affidavits filed by the 
parties and having rendered its written ruling on these motions 
dated July 12, 1989, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Paragraph 5 of the 
Affidavit of Nick Faulkner is stricken, except the portion 
thereof where plaintiff Faulkner admits that the plaintiffs took 
possession of the property, and summary judgment is hereby 
granted in favor of the defendant Thomas K. Welch and against 
the plaintiffs Nick Faulkner and Karyl Faulkner and the 
plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed with prejudice as against the 
defendant Thomas K. Welch. 
DATED this /f" day of J uLy , 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
T^he Honorable RonaJ/d 0. Hyde 
District Court Jud^e 
~
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